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Local-Level Accountability in a Dominant
Party System
This article investigates accountability in South Africa’s dominant party system by
studying how the African National Congress (ANC) reacts to electoral incentives
at the local level. It compares the ANC’s degree of responsiveness to voters across
municipalities with different levels of political competition. The analysis focuses
on whether and under which conditions the ANC is more likely to renominate
better quality municipal councillors. It examines the relationship between
renomination as ANC municipal councillor and local government performance –
as measured by voter signals, service delivery and audit outcomes. The results
show that the ANC does indeed adapt its behaviour to electoral incentives. In
municipalities where the ANC has larger margins of victory, performance matters
little for renomination. In contrast, in municipalities with higher electoral compe-
tition, local government performance is strongly correlated with renomination.
These results suggest the need to expand dominant party research to topics of
voter responsiveness and sub-national behaviour.
Keywords: accountability, dominant parties, electoral competition, South
Africa, African National Congress
DOMINANT PARTIES – PARTIES WINNING ELECTORAL MAJORITIES FOR A SUSTAINED
amount of time – exist in many developing countries.1 In Sub-Saharan
Africa, such parties rule in a majority of countries (Bogaards 2004;
Lindberg and Jones 2010) but they are also present in countries such
as Algeria, Armenia and Singapore. Their prevalence has generated
new research interest in recent years (see Bogaards and Boucek 2010;
Boucek 2012; De Jager and Du Toit 2013).
A core focus of this literature is the implications of dominant
parties for the quality of democracy.2 The relationship of dominant
parties with democracy is mostly addressed in terms of infractions of
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democratic rules and procedures. This is well illustrated in the
literature about party dominance in South Africa, where the African
National Congress (ANC) has been in power for the past 20 years.
The literature on the perils of the ANC’s dominance emerged shortly
after South Africa’s ﬁrst democratic elections in 1994 (Giliomee
1998; Giliomee et al. 2001; Southall 2005). A signiﬁcant part of these
studies are cast in terms of the threats dominant parties pose to
democracy and assumes a ‘basic tension between dominant-party rule
and democracy’ (Giliomee and Simkins 1999: 337).3 The main
question put forward in much South African work on the topic is
whether there is a natural evolution from a dominant party in a
democracy to a dominant autocratic party and whether South Africa
is on that path (for recent examples, see De Jager and Du Toit
2013: 3; or Southall 2014: 48).
In contrast to this concern about regime-level issues, another core
element of democracy – accountability to voters – is not a major focus
of this literature. The dominant party literature naturally recognizes
vertical accountability to be relevant for the quality of democracy but
does not take the issue up systematically (e.g. De Jager and Du Toit
2013). Some work addresses the issue indirectly and argues that
dominant parties may be sensitive to public pressures and demands
because of internal factions from all ideological spectrums and the
mere existence of opposition parties but does not explore the
mechanisms and scope conditions in more detail (e.g. Kothari 1964;
Reddy 2005; see also discussion in Southall 2005). At any rate, most
work appears to take a certain disregard for voters for granted, not
least because many dominant parties win electoral majorities as a
result of having a special bond with the electorate (which may be
ethnic or because of the party’s role in major historical events). This
is again illustrated by parts of the South African literature that paint
a picture of a party that is essentially unconcerned with its voters,
given that it beneﬁts from race-based support (see, for example,
Giliomee and Simkins 1999).4
However, whether and how dominant parties react to voter
concerns is essentially an empirical question. Does a dominant party
setting automatically imply a disregard for voters, or do parties in
such a setting still react to electoral incentives?
This article investigates this question by looking at the ANC’s
responsiveness to voters at the local level. Since the ﬁrst democratic
local elections in 2000, the ANC has governed the overwhelming
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majority of South African municipalities. This general dominance
masks, however, large differences in the margins of victory – ranging
from 0.5 to 90 percentage points (pps) – by which the ANC won local
elections. The article systematically studies how the ANC reacts
to electoral incentives by comparing the ANC’s degree of respon-
siveness to voters in municipalities where the ANC is dominant in
elections vs. those where it is not.
In this article, responsiveness to voters is addressed via studying
whether high-quality politicians remain and low-quality politicians
are removed from ofﬁce. The analysis focuses on the ANC’s reno-
mination choices regarding municipal councillors. The ANC’s dom-
inance in elections and its highly formalized nomination process
implies that accountability of individual politicians in South Africa
operates by and large via the party committees that control nomi-
nation. Whether better-performing councillors are more likely to be
renominated for a second term is thus a crucial test for the party’s
responsiveness to voters.
Looking at renomination has the additional advantage that there
is a record of voter signals and of achievements in service delivery and
ﬁnancial management that the party could consider in the nomina-
tion process. Generally, if voter signals and performance affect
renomination, it would mean that the ANC shows some degree of
responsiveness to voters in spite of its electoral dominance. If those
factors are unrelated to renomination, it implies that other
considerations, such as party loyalty or closeness to the leaders,
matter more for ANC candidate nominations.
The results show a mixed picture. The strongest and most
consistent ﬁnding is that the ANC does differentiate between places
where it has electoral hegemony and places where it does not. In
competitive places (that is, municipalities with low margins of
victory), renomination for higher status councillor positions is
strongly and positively associated with all performance indicators.
In uncompetitive municipalities, only service delivery is positively
associated with renomination, whereas voter signals and ﬁnancial
management have no impact. Moreover, the effect of service delivery
in competitive municipalities is much larger than in uncompetitive
municipalities. These results are robust to alternative speciﬁcations of
competitiveness.
These ﬁndings have important implications for the literature on
dominant parties. The ﬁrst is that a lack of accountability in
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dominant party systems is not a given and that the literature should
focus more on party–voter relations at different levels of government
in these systems. At the local level, the ANC behaved very much like
a ‘standard party’ as described by the literature on political
competition and accountability: when electoral competition is high,
parties are more responsive to voter concerns and perform better on
various issues (Besley and Burgess 2002; Grifﬁn 2006; Hobolt and
Klemmensen 2008). The results of this article show that this logic
appears to guide the behaviour of the ANC at the local level.
At the same time, accountability was not altogether absent in
uncompetitive municipalities, as suggested by the ﬁndings on service
delivery. The fact that responsiveness to voters’ concerns exists for
highly salient issues – as is the case for service delivery that has
generated waves of protest in South Africa over the past decade
(Alexander 2010; Booysen 2007) – suggests that even dominant
parties might exhibit some responsiveness when the stakes are high.
Second, the ﬁndings in this article can inform the debate
on dominant parties at the national level. Local-level ﬁndings are
certainly not directly transferable to the national level, and the
prospects of losing power at the national level might induce other
reactions than losing power in a municipality. Nevertheless, the
ﬁndings from the local level would suggest that accountability
increases as margins of victory decrease and that a dominant party
threatened by the loss of power might well react by putting up a
bigger electoral ﬁght rather than bend the rules.
The article is organized as follows. The next section brieﬂy
presents local government prerogatives and challenges in South
Africa. It then explains the empirical approach and data. The fourth
section discusses candidate selection procedures and renomination
patterns in the 2011 election. The following section presents the
empirical model and the results, and discusses the mechanisms at
play. A ﬁnal section provides some concluding remarks.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND LOCAL ELECTIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA
The present-day shape of local government in South Africa originates
from the ﬁnal transition negotiations in the early 1990s. In 1995–6,
transitional local councils were elected. Similarly to the national level,
local governments of unity were established that also included
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apartheid local elites, and important decisions such as the budget vote
could only be taken with a two-thirds majority (Powell 2012). In
this interim phase, new municipalities were demarcated. These
municipalities are rather large, with a total of 232 local municipalities
and an additional eight so-called metropolitan municipalities with high
population density (such as Cape Town, Johannesburg or Port
Elizabeth). In addition, district municipalities were established that
include around four local municipalities and are supposed to support
local governments. The transition phase ended in 2000 with the holding
of the ﬁrst truly democratic local elections. Since then, two additional
elections were held at the local level in 2006 and 2011; in both, the ANC
won the majority of seats in an overwhelming proportion of the muni-
cipalities (in 203 municipalities in 2006, in 197 municipalities in 2011).
Local governments are ﬁnanced by a mix of local taxes, service
charges and grants from the national treasury. Because of the very
uneven socioeconomic development of South African provinces – a
legacy of apartheid politics – the share of own resources and transfers
from national treasury differs greatly between municipalities. Many
municipalities that absorbed former homelands and rural areas in
provinces such as Mpumalanga or Limpopo depend fully on these
national transfers.5
The core functions of local governments are the delivery of basic
services (such as electricity, water, sanitation, waste removal, housing)
and local economic development. Because the apartheid regime
invested very little in non-white areas, a large number of black
households had no access to such services in the mid-1990s. Since the
end of apartheid, there have been large investments in the extension
of infrastructure and services, and a policy of providing free basic
services to poor households was introduced during the 2000s.
Nevertheless, there are still signiﬁcant numbers of South African
households that remain without access to decent sanitation,
electricity or clean water.6 Indeed, service delivery remains the core
battleground of local politics, with high numbers of so-called service
delivery protests (Alexander 2010; Atkinson 2007; Booysen 2007) and
many election slogans focusing on the topic.
There is a broad consensus that local governments are under-
performing. Core problems are lack of qualiﬁed personnel,
wasteful expenditures, inefﬁciency and corruption (Amtaika 2013).
These problems are acknowledged as much in the reports of the
auditor-general (Auditor-General 2011), the presidency (Department of
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Performance and Evaluation 2012) or the Ministry of Cooperative
Government and Traditional Affairs (Department of Cooperative
Government and Traditional Affairs 2009) as in national-level initiatives
to improve the performance of local governments (such as the National
Turnaround Strategy for Local Government (see Powell 2012).
In sum, local governments have been assigned a very important
role in addressing the large inequalities in basic service provision
found at the end of apartheid in South Africa but are struggling to
achieve this goal. Responsiveness to voter demands at the local level
would imply that the ANC rewards councillors who are doing a better
job in reaching this objective.
EMPIRICAL APPROACH AND DATA
This study aims to assess the degree of accountability of the nationally
dominant ANC at the local level in South Africa. The main question
is whether good-quality politicians remain and low-quality politicians
are removed from ofﬁce. The analysis thus focuses on whether the
ANC, as a party, is more likely to renominate better-quality municipal
councillors. This contrasts with the standard approach to account-
ability that investigates the relationship between the performance of
individual politicians and voting behaviour (see, for example, the
review by Pande 2011). The focus on renomination choices by parties
is, however, particularly sensible in South Africa because a high level
of formalization of the candidate selection process (Mac Giollabhuí
2013), together with party dominance, implies that individual
councillors are mostly accountable to the party.
There are, of course, many factors potentially affecting candidate
selection for local ofﬁce in the ANC in addition to councillor quality.
The most important one noted in the literature is factionalism.
Factions play a role because the ANC’s ‘ofﬁcial factions’ (that is, the
South African Communist Party and the Congress of South African
Trade Unions) have to be accommodated in the candidate selection
process (Mac Giollabhuí 2013) or because ‘unofﬁcial factions’ (that
is, Jacob Zuma vs. Thabo Mbeki, Zuma vs. Kgalema Motlanthe, Zuma
vs. Julius Malema, or even more localized factions) attempt to
inﬂuence the selection procedures, for example, by adding members
to the local branches (Butler 2015; Cooper 2015). The importance of
factionalism for candidate selection is, however, not a problem for
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this study. To the contrary: to ﬁnd that councillor performance has
an effect on renomination would be an even more important signal
of responsiveness to voters in view of such a countervailing force.
Figure 1 shows a schematic representation of the study’s approach,
including the timing at which the different outcomes and explana-
tory variables are observed. As shown in the ﬁgure, the analysis
concerns councillors who were elected in 2006. During their term,
the party receives information on their quality. Councillor quality is
operationalized by municipal-level performance indicators. The
analysis focuses on observable performance – that is, voter signals,
service delivery and the ﬁnancial management of the municipality.7
Apart from audits, the explanatory variables are measured as that
variable’s evolution during the councillors’ term. When it comes to
the renomination decision in 2011, the party may or may not take
councillor performance into consideration; possibly, the effect is
mediated by the degree of electoral competition at the municipality.
The analysis relies on South African electoral and administrative
data that are publicly available. Table A.1 in the online appendix
provides a deﬁnition of the variables and their data sources. The
article has to rely on aggregate municipal data because electoral
wards are redistricted before each municipal election in South Africa
and are thus not comparable across time. Performance indicators are
thus averages at the municipal level, renomination decisions are
Figure 1
Schematic Representation of the Approach
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expressed in terms of municipal-level share. The analysis is restricted
to the 192 municipalities governed by the ANC from 2006 to 2011.
For councillor renomination, it relies on data from South Africa’s
Independent Electoral Commission, which publishes the names of
elected councillors as well as the names of candidates on its website.8
The analysis considers two types of councillors: ward councillors,
who are selected via a ﬁrst-past-the-post system in municipal
subunits (wards), and proportional representation councillors – PR
councillors – who are selected as part of a closed party list at the
municipal level.9
Voter signals about local government performance are proxied by
the Evolution of the ANC’s vote share in national elections in a given
municipality. Thus, for voter signals about the performance of local
governments elected in 2006, the evolution of the party’s vote share
between the 2004 and the 2009 national elections is used. This
is based on the assumption that the design, provision and
implementation of municipal-level policies – such as crucial service
delivery – are key for the quality of life of a majority of South Africans
and are thus likely to affect strongly national vote share.
Using changes in vote share as a performance indicator would, of
course, make little sense if voting in South Africa was indeed a racial
census – that is, a simple ‘racial headcount’. However, the works of
Ferree (2011) and Mattes (2002) show that this is not the case.
According to these studies, voters do care about government
performance, and changes in voting behaviour thus provide informa-
tion about whether voters evaluate performance positively or negatively.
At the same time, many African voters view the key opposition party
Democratic Alliance as serving white interests.10 This implies, ﬁrstly,
that voters react less strongly to ANC performance than they would if
better alternatives were available, and, secondly, that dissatisﬁed voters
would rather protest by abstaining than by voting for another party
(Mattes 2002). Therefore, an indicator of voter signals needs to take
turnout into account and will be the evolution of ANC vote share
between 2004 and 2009 as a percentage of registered voters.
In addition to this subjective indicator, the analysis is based on two
objective indicators of local performance. Objective performance will
be assessed most importantly by service delivery which, as discussed
above, is a core task and challenge for local governments. Differences
in the access to water, good-quality sanitation and electricity will be
used as indicators of changes in service delivery between the 2006
58 GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION
© The Author 2016. Published by Government and Opposition Limited and Cambridge University Press
and 2011 elections according to data from the South African
Community Survey in 2007 and from the Census in 2011.11 The
variables used are the differences of logs in household access to tap
water, to sanitation (as measured by households having a ﬂush toilet
connected to the sewer system) and to electricity (as measured by the
main source for lighting).12 These variables thus capture percentage
changes in service delivery over the council term.
The second objective performance indicator is the audit opinions
in 2010. These audit opinions are provided in yearly reports by the
auditor-general and will be used as an indicator of the seriousness
with which a municipality approaches ﬁnancial management.13 The
variable is coded from 0 (disclaimer) to 4 (unqualiﬁed opinion). In
2010, only 2 per cent of the municipalities received an unqualiﬁed
audit opinion (that is, outright approval with no provisos), 40 per
cent were ﬁnancially unqualiﬁed but had issues with compliance with
laws and regulations, and the remainder ranged from disclaimers
over adverse, to qualiﬁed opinions (Auditor-General 2011). Although
the state of a municipality’s accounts is obviously related to the skills
of that town’s municipal manager and chief ﬁnancial ofﬁcer, a town’s
governing party is supposed to oversee them and therefore has a role
to play in how well the budget is managed.14
RENOMINATION PATTERNS IN THE ANC
Renomination rates at the local level are generally low in South Africa.
Figure 2 shows the ANC’s renomination outcomes by displaying the
fate of ANC councillors alongside those of its two core competitors
during the period of this study, the Democratic Alliance and the
Inkatha Freedom Party.15 For comparison, it also includes the
renomination rates for the ward councillors that were elected in 2000
(not used in the subsequent analysis because the names of the PR
councillors were not available for that election). The ﬁgure highlights
the generally very low renomination rates for ANC councillors, with
about half of them not running in the subsequent elections. The ANC
is not an exception: the renomination rates of the Inkatha Freedom
Party are as low and those of the Democratic Alliance are only about
10 percentage points higher. This is true as much for the councillors
elected in 2000 as those elected in 2006. Low levels of renomination
are thus a general feature of South African municipal politics.
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It is important to note that these low renomination rates are the
effect of neither a lack of attractiveness of councillor positions nor
substantial political upward mobility. Especially since 2006, municipal
councillors earn sizeable salaries even in smaller towns. Most of the
councillors would have few outside employment opportunities, and
being a councillor opens the door not only to a salary but to
opportunities of patronage and personal enrichment (Atkinson 2007).
There is also no evidence that signiﬁcant numbers of councillors move
on to district-, provincial- or even national-level political careers.16 The
most plausible explanation for the low renomination rates is thus that
parties do not want to nominate councillors for a second term.
It is important to distinguish between the different status of the
different councillor positions, namely ward, PR and district council-
lors. The hierarchy between these positions is quite clear. The least
desirable job is that of ward councillor, who is directly exposed to
citizen discontent and is generally expected to attend community
meetings and run a ward committee (which are not included in the
duties of PR councillors). PR councillors are more likely to be
appointed to better remunerated and more prestigious municipal
positions, such as mayor or member of the municipality’s executive
Figure 2
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committee (Piper 2012). Additionally, being a PR or district coun-
cillor is still viewed as opening the path to a provincial or even
national career.17 This hierarchy of councillor positions implies that a
study of party accountability has to consider not only the overall
renomination rate, but also who gets renominated for better status
jobs (PR or district councillor). The analysis below will thus use as
outcome variable the renomination share for better status councillor
position alongside the overall renomination share.
Figure 3 displays the renomination rates for different councillor
positions, distinguished by whether a councillor was elected in 2006
in a ward or on the PR list. Both types of councillors have about a
50 per cent chance of being nominated for another term, implying
that dissatisfaction with both types of councillor is equal. The speciﬁc
renomination pattern is, however, rather distinct and supports the
argument of different statuses associated with different councillor
positions. Ward councillors are as likely to be renominated for PR
councillor roles as they are to remain in the ward, suggesting that they
strive to become PR councillors. Conversely, PR councillors are rarely
nominated as ward candidates (about 5 per cent). District councillor
nominations are more likely for PR councillors (7 per cent) than for
Figure 3
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ward councillors (2 per cent), suggesting that upward mobility occurs
stepwise (from ward to PR to district.
Nominations for different councillor positions are controlled by
different ANC party bodies, which affects to whom councillors are
accountable. Ward councillors are nominated by the ANC’s local
branches, which are geographically aligned with the wards, with some
involvement of the regional list committee, located at the level of the
district municipalities. In the ﬁnal choice, popularity in the ward is
supposed to be a key criterion (African National Congress 2010:
C.34).18 In principle, ward-level interests and concerns should play a
core role in the selection of this type of candidate.19 Nominations
for the proportional representation list also come from the local
branches, but the role of the regional list committee is much more
important in their selection. The list committee is supposed to
consider the number of nominations received by a candidate, the
candidate’s skills and experience and – not further speciﬁed –
‘criteria of the ANC’ (African National Congress 2010: C.40). This
implies that the regional list committee has wide scope to draw up the
list and that the interests pursued by this committee will be very
strongly reﬂected in the selection of party representative candidates.
Therefore, the selection of PR councillors signals party-level concerns
whereas the selection of ward councillors is more driven by the local
communities. For a study of party-level accountability, the drivers of
renomination for PR councillors should thus be of special interest.
PERFORMANCE, ELECTORAL COMPETITION AND RENOMINATION
IN THE ANC
Empirical Model
The empirical model consists of OLS regressions of renomination
shares (outcome variables) on different performance indicators
(explanatory variables). The party is considered accountable if
renomination shares are higher in municipalities with better out-
comes; it is considered unresponsive if renomination shares are
unrelated to municipal-level performance. The analysis considers
ﬁrst the relationship between renomination and performance for all
municipalities; in a second step, it considers the role of electoral
competitiveness for the relationship.
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For the basic results, equations of the following type are estimated:
Rij ¼ αj + β1CQi + β2popi + β3Ashi + β4Cshi + β5Wshi + εi
where i indexes municipalities and j indexes provinces. R denotes
generically the renomination share and can either be the renomi-
nation shares of ward councillors (Wr), PR councillors (Pr), or for
high-status councillor positions (HSr). The coefﬁcient of interest is
β1, the associated variable CQ represents councillor quality and is
measured by voter signals (chgV ), service delivery (chgEl, chgWa,
chgSa), or ﬁnancial management (aud), as explained above (see
Table A.1 in the online appendix). αj are provincial ﬁxed effects
ensuring that the analysis does compare relatively similar munici-
palities and does not simply capture the difference between very
developed, high capacity municipalities (for instance, in the Western
Cape and Gauteng) and those with low levels of socioeconomic
development and low capacity (for instance, in Mpumalanga and
Limpopo). Popi (log of population size) as well as Ashi, Cshi and Wshi
(shares of the respective population groups) are additional controls
accounting for differences in income and starting levels of service
delivery and capacity of the municipalities. εi is the error term.
In a second step, the role of political competition is brought in. In
this study, political competition is deﬁned as margins of victory below
25 percentage points. Although this high threshold deﬁes common
understandings of political competition, it was necessary to ensure
enough statistical power for this analysis.20 The number of competitive
municipalities in the analysis is 37 out of the 192 municipalities won by
the ANC. The mean margin of victory in competitive municipalities
is 11 percentage points, in uncompetitive municipalities, it is
60 percentage points. Political competition deﬁned in this way takes
place mainly in the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal, with some
additional municipalities in the Eastern Cape and the Northern Cape.
For the results on the role of political competition, equations of
the following type are estimated:
Rij ¼ αj + β1CQi + β2CQiXcompi + β3compi + β4popi
+ β5Ashi + β6Cshi + β7Wshi + εi
where the coefﬁcients of interest are β1 that shows the effect of
councillor quality in uncompetitive municipalities and β2 that shows
the differential effect of political competition.
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Basic Results: Performance and Renomination
Tables 1–3 display the results from OLS regressions of renomination
shares of councillors elected in 2006 on the different performance
indicators. In each table, the three columns correspond to different
renomination outcomes. The ﬁrst column displays the overall share
of ward councillors (elected in 2006) that received a nomination for
another term in 2011 – in any form. The second column displays the
same information for the PR councillors. The third column shows
the share of those being renominated for a high-status position in
2011 – that is, as PR or district municipality councillor – irrespective
of the position they held in 2006. Whereas the ﬁrst two columns thus
capture the overall shares of those seen ﬁt to stand for another term,
the third column shows the type of councillor the ANC renominates
for better jobs.
The coefﬁcients are generally positive but typically not very large
and mostly insigniﬁcant. There is no signiﬁcant effect of voter signals
on renomination, for audits the coefﬁcients are virtually zero. On the
other hand, improvements in service delivery appear to be correlated
with renomination for better status jobs. In particular, a 10 per cent
increase in households with access to tap water leads to a 1 percen-
tage point increase in renomination for better positions. Additional
results for electricity and sanitation are shown in Tables A.3 and A.4
in the online appendix and conﬁrm these ﬁndings.
Table 1














Evolution vote share 0409 0.575 0.415 0.153
(0.357) (0.432) (0.272)
Observations 192 192 192
F 1.698 1.595 2.170
Prob> F 0.065 0.090 0.013
r2 0.0987 0.0910 0.117
Note : Each regression with provincial ﬁxed effect and controls for population
group shares and log of municipality population.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*p<0.1, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01.
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In sum, it appears that local government performance has overall
no important impact on renomination in the ANC, a result that
would suggest that party dominance does indeed go together with
Table 2














Evolution access water 0.070 0.129** 0.094**
(0.059) (0.064) (0.042)
Observations 192 192 192
F 1.525 1.719 2.412
Prob > F 0.112 0.060 0.005
r2 0.0907 0.0999 0.136
Note : Each regression with provincial ﬁxed effects and controls for
population group shares and log of municipality population.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*p< 0.1, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01.
Table 3














Audits problematic − 0.001 − 0.015 − 0.027
(0.044) (0.052) (0.031)
Audits good 0.011 0.012 0.005
(0.042) (0.058) (0.026)
Observations 192 192 192
F 1.238 1.288 2.012
Prob > F 0.252 0.221 0.020
r2 0.085 0.087 0.120
Note : Each regression with provincial ﬁxed effects and controls for
population group shares and log of municipality population.
Reference (Omitted) Category: disclaimer. Audits problematic: opinion
adverse opinion and qualiﬁed. Audits good: opinion unqualiﬁed
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*p< 0.1, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01.
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relative lack of responsiveness to voter concerns. Only performance
in terms of service delivery improvements appears to be related to
renomination, but the effects are small in size.
The Role of Political Competition
Tables 4–6 display the results on the role of political competition. As in
the previous tables, the columns represent different types of renomi-
nation outcomes. As mentioned, the coefﬁcients of interest are those
showing the results for the respective performance indicator in
uncompetitive municipalities (for example, access to water or audits)
and those showing the effect in competitive municipalities as given
by the interaction term of the performance indicator with an
indicator variable of political competition (e.g. water × competitive or
audits × competitive).21
The general picture emerging from these tables is clear:
Performance is generally unrelated to renomination in uncompetitive
municipalities except for service delivery. In contrast, political
competition plays a clear role – whether in terms of voter signals,
service delivery or audit reports – in renomination for higher-status
councillor positions, that is, as PR or district councillor. The coefﬁcients
displaying the interaction terms of political competition and the
respective performance indicator are almost always large, positive
and signiﬁcant. For example, for voter signals, the coefﬁcient for
renomination in uncompetitive municipalities is mostly zero. In
contrast, a 10 percentage point increase in vote share leads to a
12 per cent increase in renomination for better status councillor
positions. Results for additional service delivery indicators (electricity
and sanitation, displayed in Tables A.5 and A.6 in the online appendix)
conﬁrm these ﬁndings.
Unlike renomination for higher-status positions, competitiveness
has no inﬂuence on the overall renomination shares of ward
councillors where the effect is mostly 0 and always insigniﬁcant. For
PR councillors, the picture looks slightly different with a large
differential effect of voter signals in competitive municipalities,
and generally positive and relatively large coefﬁcients for the other
performance indicators although with large standard errors.
In sum, it appears that nomination in the ANC follows quite
different logics in competitive and uncompetitive municipalities.
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Table 4






















Competitive −0.266*** 0.004 −0.064
(0.076) (0.088) (0.056)
Observations 192 192 192
F 2.158 3.456 3.593
Prob > F 0.010 0.000 0.000
r2 0.166 0.188 0.186
Note : Each regression with provincial ﬁxed effects and controls for
population group shares and log of municipality population.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*p< 0.1, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01.
Table 5











high-status jobs in 2011
Access to water 0.0746 0.119* 0.0729*
(0.0621) (0.0646) (0.0434)
Water ×Competitive 0.0529 0.0665 0.313*
(0.243) (0.402) (0.180)
Competitive −0.224** 0.122 − 0.0498
(0.0901) (0.145) (0.0735)
Observations 192 192 192
F 1.927 1.625 2.249
Prob > F 0.141 0.075 0.002
r2 0.126 0.110 0.139
Note : Each regression with provincial ﬁxed effects and controls for
population group shares and log of municipality population.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*p< 0.1, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01.
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Table 6














Audits problematic −0.038 −0.045 −0.032
(0.044) (0.050) (0.032)
Audits good −0.027 0.009 −0.027
(0.041) (0.061) (0.027)
Aud. problem×Competitive 0.272 0.338 0.036
(0.169) (0.242) (0.110)
Aud. good ×Competitive 0.181 0.146 0.152*
(0.130) (0.160) (0.088)
Competitive −0.316*** 0.036 −0.085
(0.103) (0.160) (0.084)
Observations 192 192 192
F 2.331 1.447 1.814
Prob > F 0.005 0.060 0.021
r2 0.133 0.103 0.130
Note : Each regression with provincial ﬁxed effects and controls for population group shares and log of municipality population.
Reference (Omitted) Category: disclaimer. Audits problematic: opinion adverse and qualiﬁed. Audits good: opinion unqualiﬁed.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.




















































When the party faces more serious political competition, the
performance of local governments plays a role in securing a
nomination for a higher-status position whereas on the whole this is
not the case when it is fully dominant in local governments. These
results suggest that even if a party is overall dominant in elections, it
can react to local electoral incentives. In competitive places,
disgruntled voters have a bigger chance of having an impact on the
party’s re-election into local government and the party thus selects
political personnel that have better track records. In turn, fewer
incentives for responsiveness to voter demands are present in
uncompetitive places, and criteria other than performance appear to
drive renomination. Interestingly, the effect of competitiveness is
only present for renomination for higher-status councillor positions,
and, to some extent, for overall renomination shares of PR
councillors.22
DISCUSSION
These results raise a number of questions concerning the
interpretation and the possible channels through which competi-
tiveness operates.
The ﬁrst question is whether competitiveness is really driving the
results. The most important argument against the interpretation that
it is political competition per se is that the effect is not present for
renomination as ward councillor. In other words, if the concern is
that the party might lose control over a municipality, should it not
also renominate better-performing ward councillors? This is perhaps
even more puzzling because ward councillors are elected through a
ﬁrst-past-the-post electoral system that would allow voters to vote a
disliked councillor directly out of ofﬁce. However, there are two
factors that can explain why municipal-level competitiveness might
not affect the renomination as ward councillors. The ﬁrst concerns
the different nomination procedures for these positions. As discussed
above, the nomination of ward councillors is mainly an affair of the
party’s local branches, which are aligned with the wards. In these
nominations, local concerns and local assessments of ward councillor
quality are likely to matter more than municipal-level considerations.
This quality is probably not captured by municipal-level indicators of
performance – that is, a ward councillor might have been doing a
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good job for the ward irrespective of the overall performance of
the municipality’s government. In contrast, PR councillors are
nominated by a municipal-level committee with additional inter-
ference from the higher-level party committees. It makes sense that
this type of committee would have the party’s overall success in the
municipality in mind, if necessary.
The second factor is that wards in competitive municipalities
do not have to be more competitive than in uncompetitive
municipalities. Indeed, in South Africa, the average margin of victory
at the ward level is much higher than the average margin of victory at
the municipal level in competitive municipalities (see Table A.7 in
the online appendix). For wards, it is 34 percentage points, for the
municipalities it is more than 20 percentage points lower. In short,
wards within competitive municipalities do not face the same
electoral incentives as the municipality as a whole.
The second question is whether the speciﬁc threshold (<25 percentage
points margin of victory) affected the results. Tables A.8–A.10 in the
online appendix therefore show the results with an alternative
speciﬁcation for the interaction term that measures the closeness of
elections in a continuous variable (1 minus margin of victory). All main
results hold with this alternative speciﬁcation of competitiveness.23
The third question is whether there is something about these
competitive municipalities that contradicts the story that it is the
performance of councillors that affects their renomination for better-
status jobs. Two alternative interpretations are possible. One is that
the ANC put better-quality politicians in competitive municipalities in
the ﬁrst place – that is, as candidates in 2006 local elections. Because
they are better qualiﬁed and/or more motivated, these better-quality
councillors do a better job during their term and are more likely
to be renominated. This would not contradict the general argument
that the ANC differentiates its strategy according to local electoral
incentives, but the mechanism would not be via an ex post respon-
siveness to performance but as an a priori concern (as put forward by
Galasso and Nannicini 2011). If it were the case that better-quality
councillors were already installed in 2006, one should expect
that councillors are generally more likely to be renominated in
competitive municipalities than in uncompetitive ones. However, this
is not the case for the ANC, as the renomination rate in 2011 is quite
similar (46 per cent in competitive municipalities versus 48 per cent
in uncompetitive municipalities).
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A second alternative interpretation against the argument that it is
indeed councillor performance that is related to renomination in
competitive municipalities is that the ANC as a whole cares about
competitive places and invests more in these municipalities through
national or provincial spending. As a result, service delivery improves
and voters might be happier with local governments, and possibly this
could also affect renomination. Although this would again imply that
the ANC has a special strategy for competitive municipalities, the
mechanism would look to be a deliberate vote-buying strategy, made
possible through national and provincial dominance. However, as
shown in Table A.17 in the online appendix, the evolution in service
delivery is unrelated to competitiveness.
In sum, it appears that the mechanism at play is in fact that
councillor performance as measured by voter signals, service delivery
and ﬁnancial management plays a role for renomination in the ANC
in municipalities where political competition is higher.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This article studied accountability at the local level in South Africa’s
dominant party system. It analysed whether performance and voter
signals mattered in the renomination decision regarding municipal
councillors. The ﬁndings showed that the ANC is mainly responsive
to voters in municipalities that it won with smaller margins of victory.
In this type of municipality, performance and voter signals were
strongly and positively correlated with renomination for better
councillor positions. In municipalities that the ANC had won with
larger margins of victory, only improvements in service delivery
appeared to matter for renomination, and the effects were
comparatively small.
The ﬁndings of this article point to a need to expand dominant
party research in additional directions. Firstly, the ﬁndings suggest a
more general importance of looking at consequences of dominant
party systems beyond the regime/democracy level. Among these
consequences are crucial outcomes in terms of vertical accountability
of dominant parties as well as – as Lindberg and Jones (2010)
argue – the thus far little-studied consequences for economic devel-
opment or corruption. Secondly, the ﬁndings highlight the
signiﬁcance of dominant party behaviour at the sub-national level.
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On the one hand, this is relevant if we are to understand the full impact
of dominant party systems on citizen welfare. On the other hand, it is
relevant because the behaviour of dominant parties at the sub-national
level can generate insights on whether a speciﬁc party is still playing
by the rules when faced by heightened electoral competition.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
To view supplementary material for this article, please visit http://dx.
doi.org/10.1017/gov.2016.1
NOTES
1 Until the 1980s and 1990s, dominant party systems were also present in a number of
advanced industrial countries such as Sweden, Italy or Japan (Boucek 2014).
2 Other lines of research particularly concern the emergence and survival of
dominant parties and their identiﬁcation. In contrast, there is to date little research
on the consequences of dominant party rule for socioeconomic outcomes
(Lindberg and Jones 2010).
3 For a recent exception, see Reddy (2005).
4 As the literature on voting behaviour in South Africa shows, the assumption that
African voters support the ANC no matter what, is incorrect. Instead, African voters
do react to performance, although mostly by abstaining. This literature is
discussed below.
5 The ‘homelands’, established by the apartheid government, were areas to which the
majority of the Black population was moved to prevent them from living in the
urban areas.
6 According to ﬁgures from the 2011 Census, around 40 per cent of households still
lack ﬂush toilets connected to the sewerage system. Around 30 per cent have no
access to piped water and around 15 per cent are without access to electricity
(as measured by households using electricity for lighting (see SA News 2012).
7 The party has, of course, additional information on councillor characteristics that
might affect renomination, for example on involvement in corruption, or on a
councillor’s efforts and diligence.
8 To determine the renomination rates, the names of elected councillors and
subsequent candidates were matched by party. The published names include a
person’s middle names so that in the whole data set of 8,000 ANC candidates in
2011 only two candidates had the same name.
9 Municipalities have the same, or close to the same number of ward and PR
councillors.
10 The Democratic Alliance was ofﬁcially founded in 2000 as an alliance of the
Democratic Party and the New National Party and the much smaller Federal
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Alliance. The alliance lasted only for a year and the party now mostly consists of the
previous leaders of the Democratic Party (Jolobe 2012).
11 The data on service delivery come from the Community Survey 2007 and the National
Census in 2011. They are available at http://interactive.statssa.gov.za/superweb.
12 Differences of logs are better indicators than differences in the share of households
with access to these goods because shares are inﬂuenced by differences in population
size of a municipality. In other words, a municipality with a decreasing population
size would appear to have a good record of service delivery without actually increasing
electricity connections, sanitation or access to tap water, and vice versa.
13 These data are published on the auditor-general’s website: www.agsa.co.za.
14 A correlation matrix of the different explanatory variables is provided in Table A.2
in the online appendix. As can be expected, the service delivery indicators are
strongly correlated (around 0.5), but the change of votes and audits are not. In any
case, these variables are not entered jointly in the regressions.
15 The Inkatha is no longer a serious competitor. It lost about half of its votes in the
2011 local election, a trend that was conﬁrmed in the 2014 national election, when it
only won about half a million votes.
16 The renomination rates shown above include a councillor’s renomination as district
councillor. Moreover, the matching of councillors and the respective party’s
candidates for the 2009 general and provincial elections shows that only a very small
number of municipal councillors make it to the national and provincial level.
17 Interviews with provincial leaders of the ANC and the Democratic Alliance,
Cape Town, April 2013.
18 In theory, the core adjustment that could be made by the provincial list committee
would be to ensure the gender quota of 50:50 in the ANC’s proposed candidates.
19 After serious discontent regarding the 2011 ward candidate selection, the ANC
ordered a high-level investigation into irregularities in the selection process.
Although the details of the ﬁndings were not made public, some overall ﬁgures were
provided. In total, 419 disputes around the country were investigated and the
recommendation was that 125 councillors should be recalled (Tolsi 2013). Whereas
the discontent was much publicized, this is still a very small number out of a total of
around 4,000 available ward councillor positions. Moreover, the fact that there was
publicized unrest in some cases suggests that the guidelines were overall respected
in the other wards.
20 See the section ‘Discussion’ below for a robustness check with an alternative
speciﬁcation of political competition.
21 The indicator variable of political competition is 0 when the municipal margin of
victory is ≥25%, and 1 when the margin of victory is <25%.
22 In order to verify that the results are not driven by outliers, the analysis was rerun
with the data winsorized at the tenth percentile. All results hold with this
speciﬁcation (see Tables A.11–A16 in the online appendix).
23 Using a dummy with a threshold for the main analysis is more appropriate, given
that the effect of competitiveness is likely to be non-linear. In other words, there is
probably little difference in the perceived competitiveness of a municipality with a
margin of victory of 50 pps and one of 80 pps.
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